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SATELLITES SPOT A SOVIET BUILD-UP FOR ATOMIC ARMS

Many Silos Reported as Well
as Increased Facilities to
Build Missile Vessels

SUBMARINE TALLY IS 41

U.S. Officials Cite Urgency
of Reaching an Agreement
on Weapons Control

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WASHINGTON, Oct. 10—
Satellite photos of the Soviet
Union have uncovered evidence
of a substantial build-up of
more and better strategic nuclear
weapons.

The new information shows
that the Russians are continuing
to build two new classes of
silos, or emplacements, for large
missiles, are constructing yet
a third type of new silo, and
are doubling the production
facilities for Soviet missile sub-
marines.

Some officials in the State
and Defense Departments and
the White House say this
build-up increases the need to
secure at least a first-step arms
control agreement as soon as
possible.

Others throughout the Gov-
ernment privately stress that
unless this build-up is stopped
soon, the United States may
feel impelled to expand its own
nuclear arsenal to maintain a
balance of strategic power.

Reluctance on Details

A senior Pentagon official,
pressed for details on the ex-
tent and character of the Soviet
nuclear program, insisted that

the arms-control talks were at
such a delicate stage that the
Defense Department did not in-
tend to provide details of the
build-up until its next annual
report to Congress in February.

Other officials in various
Government departments were
sufficiently concerned, how-
ever, to sketch out some details
of the Soviet build-up.

The reconnaissance satellites
have found that the number of
silos of two different sizes gen-
erally believed designed for
improved or entirely new long-
range missiles now exceeds 90,
—up from the 10 noted early
this year and 60 seen in mid-
summer. The smaller of these
silos is significantly larger
than the 10-foot diameter of the
Russian's largest operational
missile, the SS-9.

A third type of silo, larger
than the others, has been
sighted, with one each at sev-
eral missile complexes. Analysts
believe the new holes are
destined either for a special-
purpose new missile or a new
type of command and control
facility.

The Russians now have about
41 Y-class missile submarines
ready or under construction,
thus drawing abreast of the
American Polaris submarine
force. The new intelligence
findings indicate a doubling in
size of the principal Soviet
nuclear submarine construction
yard at Severodvinsk, on the
White Sea.

1,600 Reported Completed

The total number of Russian
Intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles, completed or under con-
struction, is said to exceed
1,600, compared with 1,054 for
the United States. In addition
nearly 100 Soviet ICBM silos
at test and training centers
would be expected to be put
to use in a crisis; the United
States has only a handful of
such test silos.

The intelligence reports in-
dicate that the Russians are
working at what one senior
official calls an "incredibly in-
tense" pace in completing a
ring of anti-ballistic missile
sites around Moscow.

Publicly, the Administration,
through the President, has em-
phasized the hope for early
success in the talks to limit
strategic arms, which have
been on for two years.

On Sept. 25, President Nixon
called the prospects good.
Whether the two countries can
achieve an initial agreement
by year end, "no one can say
at this point," he declared. "We
have made progress. I believe
the goal will be achieved."

No Charge of Blackmail

He concluded: "Neither power
at this time could, if it
wanted to, gain that superior-
ity which would enable it to,
frankly, blackmail the other
one."

But privately, some senior
officials are less optimistic.
One official said:

"We have consistently un-
derestimated the numerical
goals of the Soviet missile
programs for 10 years. We
have also consistently assumed,
incorrectly I'm afraid, that
they bought our strategic con-
cept of deterrence."

"The obviously don't want
a nuclear war any more than
we. But they're building a suf-
ficient edge in nuclear strength,
and in conventional forces as
well, so they may have reason
to expect us to back down in
future confrontations, as we
made them do in the Cuban
missile crisis of 1962."

Aim Is Deterrence

The American strategy is
based on having a nuclear
force that can ride out a sur-
prise attack and retaliate
against the attacker's cities
rather than against his remain-
ing nuclear weapons. By main-
taining such an "assured de-
struction" capability, the strategy
seeks to deter nuclear war.

The arms-limitation talks are
aimed at curbing the number
of offensive and defensive nu-
clear weapons to the point
where neither side would feel
confident that it could destroy
the retaliatory capability of the
other in a surprise attack.

Administration officials differ
on the kind of missiles that are
to be deployed in the more than
90 new missile silos being built
at locations east and west of
the Ural Mountains.

The majority of analysts be-
lieve the Soviet Union would
not build the huge silos unless

it intended to install much im-
proved versions of the SS-9 and
SS-11 ICBM's or even new gen-
erations of missiles with im-
proved accuracy, reliability and
warheads.

Security a Possible Purpose

A minority view holds that
the new silos are designed to
provide greater security against
attack.

Silos of both types have been
constructed at the Tyuratam
missile test center and test fir-
ings are expected soon. Data
from such tests should dispell
much of the mystery surround-
ing the new silos, analysts be-
lieve.

The third type of new silo,
about four feet wider than the
largest ever seen, has now been
spotted, with one each at sev-
eral complexes.

Analysts are mystified about
the purpose of these silos. Some
speculate that they could house
well protected command and
control centers from which Rus-
sian missile officers could com-
mand nearby ICBM's in a war.
Others believe the holes are
designed for a special purpose
missile that is being dispersed
to achieve greater protection
against concentrated attack.

Among the possibilities cited
are the following: missiles de-
signed to carry special com-
munications satellites to com-
municate with Russian missile
submarines just before or dur-
ing a nuclear war; big rockets
set off very large explosions
over the United States in an
attempt to black out its radar
and communications temporarily
or make it difficult to fire
ICBM's through large radioac-
tion cloud, and large missiles
to carry orbiting bombs in a
crisis to persuade the United
States to back down, much as
the forward flights of Ameri-
can B-52 bombers during the
Cuban missile confrontation
were designed to force the Rus-
sians to remove their missiles
from Cuba.